Report on Events Related to the Capsizing & Sinking of L’ACADIEN II Off the Coast of Cape Breton 28/29 March 2008

Executive Summary

On the morning of March 29, 2008, a sealing vessel, the L’ACADIEN II, capsized after hitting a large chunk of ice while being towed by a Canadian Coast Guard vessel in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Four men lost their lives in the accident – three victims were recovered from the overturned hull and one victim was lost at sea.

The Canadian Coast Guard commissioned this independent investigation to report on the sequence of events that led to the accident; the events that happened directly afterwards; whether Coast Guard policies and procedures had been followed and whether they were adequate. The investigation was to also make recommendations to the Coast Guard to prevent, to the degree possible, such a tragedy from happening again.

A tremendous amount of research was conducted in the preparation of this report. Eyewitnesses were interviewed and detailed transcripts were reviewed . Because there was no video record of the accident, these eyewitness accounts were key to the investigation.

Additional research was also conducted to fill in any gaps in the recollections of the witnesses as well as to shed further light where accounts of the accident varied. A naval architect was hired to focus on ship stability and assess potential scenarios that could have caused the L’ACADIEN II to hit the ice and capsize. Six separate towing trials were conducted at sea to better understand the dynamics of the tow during the accident and the potential causes of the vessel’s capsize.

The chronology of the accident is presented in full detail in the report. On the morning of March 28, the L’ACADIEN II (home ported in Cap aux Meules on the Magdalen Islands) was on the east coast of Cape Breton attempting to reach a large concentration of seals, when it suffered rudder damage while manoeuvring in heavy ice. Unable to continue unassisted, the master of the L’ACADIEN II called for assistance at 1400. The Canadian Coast Guard vessel, DES GROSEILLIERS, responded to the call and two engineers boarded the L’ACADIEN II to assess the damage, concluding that the rudder could not be repaired at sea.

The DES GROSEILLIERS was then called to a higher priority Search and Rescue (SAR) case and departed. Around 1500, the L’ACADIEN II was advised to seek assistance from Coast Guard Radio in Sydney to request an escort. Although there were several communications with the L’ACADIEN II, it was hours before the full extent of L’ACADIEN II’s damage was understood as well as the level of assistance it required.

By 1859, Sydney Coast Guard Radio and the JRCC (Joint Rescue Coordination Centre) in Halifax more fully understood the urgency of the situation that was developing on the ice. Of particular concern were the number of damaged, ice-bound vessels and the weather forecast warning of a potential gale and onshore winds. After deliberations with a variety of Coast Guard offices, the JRCC dispatched the Canadian Coast Guard vessel, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, to the scene.

The CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER began towing the L’ACADIEN II at approximately 2250. The CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER also took another sealing vessel, the MADELINOT WAR LORD, under escort since it had been damaged in the ice and was taking on water. The three vessels traveled in an easterly direction at a slow speed, averaging 2.6 knots (4.8 Kph, 3 Mph), through pack ice that was often 8/10ths concentration.

The towing of the L’ACADIEN II continued for over two hours, proceeding slowly through challenging ice conditions until 0100 in the morning on March 29, when the three vessels entered an open lead in the ice. Soon after, the L’ACADIEN II sheered on the port quarter (the left side) of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, struck a large chunk of floating ice and capsized.

Two of the six crewmembers on board the L’ACADIEN II escaped and were rescued by the nearby MADELINOT WAR LORD. Four crewmembers were missing and a frantic rescue effort ensued, lasting for several hours. Search and Rescue Technicians from Canadian Forces Base Greenwood arrived to assist, and four divers conducted a series of dives, recovering three victims from the overturned hull. One victim was never found.

A number of key observations emerged from this investigation and are covered in detail in the report: the risks taken during the tow; how the tow was conducted; the factors that caused L’ACADIEN II to strike the ice and the factors that caused it to capsize.

From these key observations, the report arrives at eight recommendations for the Coast Guard to consider:

• conduct a full review of towing requirements, policies, processes, training and equipment
• aggressively seek, implement and apply technological methods which deliver a “common operating picture”
• conduct a reassessment of east coast waters’ jurisdictional apportionment
• refine organizational planning and risk management processes for the oversight of east coast activities
• promote the concept of record-keeping and analysis, as well as the value of shared professional lessons learned
• renew and reinvigorate engagement of the client base
• propose and participate in a coherent alignment of cross-Departmental jurisdictional domains within Canada’s east coast waters
• propose a review of the regulatory process, standards and inspection regime for vessels working and operating in ice with the applicable authoritative partners in the appropriate Departments

The eight recommendations listed above consist of both systemic and functional recommendations, each one described more fully in the report. Survivors, witnesses, family members, and the maritime community at large, all have a stake in their implementation, as do the many people who contributed to the report. While nothing can reduce the risks of life at sea to zero, the advice offered is meant to enhance operations and mitigate these risks.

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