Chapter 4 — Chronology of events

The events related to the capsizing of L’ACADIEN II include the activities of several vessels over a period of several days, in addition to the efforts of multiple shore stations such as the Marine Rescue Sub Center (MRSC) in Quebec, the Coast Guard Marine Radio Station in Sydney, the Coast Guard Regional Operations Centre in Dartmouth, NS and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Halifax. A narrative version of the chronology is presented below. A more complete and detailed time-line is available at Annex E.

4.1 The initial Voyage of L’ACADIEN II

The L’ACADIEN II left Cap aux Meules, on the Magdalen Islands, at approximately 18:00 on the evening of Wednesday, 26 March. With an experienced master and a crew of five, the intent was to engage in the seal hunt and achieve the quota which had been assigned just before setting out. It was quickly noted that ice conditions were significant in both density (often 9/10ths) and at times in thickness, indicating rafted ice which had built up during onshore blows.

The conditions off the Magdalens were more severe than most had experienced in home waters. Only the master and an experienced seaman had seen such conditions in local waters before, though not for some years. Some had experienced it further north, when hunting off Newfoundland near the Straight of Belle Isle. The L’ACADIEN II worked through ice making an easterly run to St. Paul Island and then into Sydney Bight, always in search of a concentration of the seal herd. A number of other sealers were in the area and, as is common practice in the fisheries, radio exchanges allowed some to keep track of each other and of conditions. The CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS was also at hand, observing the progress of the hunt, freeing sealers beset by the ice and, over a period of days, escorting the hunt in an eastward direction towards Cape North, on Cape Breton Island.

4.2 Damage and Connecting with Coast Guard

By late morning of Friday, 28 March, L’ACADIEN II had taken only three seals. Progress through the ice was slow but spirits were good¹¹. By this juncture, the vessel was some ten nautical miles to the east of Cape North. At approximately 11:00, while working through the ice with some fairly strong forward and aft engine movements, it was noted that the vessel’s steering was not responding correctly. Concluding that rudder damage may have occurred while working the ice, the master came across an open lead sufficient for free movement and conducted a cursory steering trial. It was discovered that the vessel’s helm could apply a mid-ships, or straight-ahead, rudder action as well as a manoeuvre to port. However, no matter the helm setting, no starboard manoeuvre was achievable. An inspection of the internal steering gear in the after end revealed no damage; in fact all internal workings seemed untouched and operating through a full and normal range of motion. The conclusion was that rudder damage had occurred externally and that whatever form of damage had occurred, it was preventing the rudder from imparting a starboard, or right-hand, turn.

L’ACADIEN II made a radio call on CH 16 seeking assistance. She first attempted to raise the Coast Guard Radio Station at Riviere-au-Renard, and then Sydney. The CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS, on scene in support of the fisheries officers assigned to the hunt, intercepted the transmissions and responded, choosing in turn to close and offer assistance.

4.3 Arrival of CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS

The CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS, home ported in Quebec City and under the operational control of the Quebec Regional Operations Centre, was tasked exclusively to observe the seal hunt in the Gulf of St. Lawrence zone in support of the Conservation and Protection segment of Fisheries and Oceans, though remaining available for SAR response in the area. Her role was to observe the conduct of the hunt and conduct enforcement operations. She had Fisheries Officers, RCMP and Sûreté du Quebec Officers on board to conduct the task.

By early mid-morning on Friday, 28 March, CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS was assisting several sealers experiencing difficulty manoeuvring towards an area of less densely packed ice, including L’ACADIEN II. Two engineers from CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS made their way to L’ACADIEN II and inspected the internal working of the steering system to assess if they might effect a measure of repair. Confirming the earlier diagnosis, the engineers found nothing amiss internally and shared the conclusion that any fault or damage seemed to lie external to the hull. Determining that he could offer no further assistance, the Commanding Officer of CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS advised the master of L’ACADIEN II to contact Sydney’s Coast Guard radio station for further assistance. Having pulled away but remaining in the vicinity, soon after, CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS was tasked to a distress case involving a vessel taking on water, a higher priority than L’ACADIEN II which was not in immediate distress.

Figure 8: Photo of the L’ACADIEN II taken by CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS

CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS left the scene, though the reason for their departure was unclear to the crew of L’ACADIEN II. L’ACADIEN II’s crew resigned themselves to wait for escort, raising coastal radio stations periodically to ensure there was ongoing awareness of their situation. It would be some 4½ hours before L’ACADIEN II was advised that the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was assigned to their case, causing much misunderstanding and frustration.

Not apparent to the vessels at sea was the fact that the radio station immediately passed the information regarding L’ACADIEN II along to the Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) and the Coast Guard Ice Office in an effort to tap into the available resources. Requests for updates on possible solutions were in fact sought throughout those 4½ hours. The fact that all the details related to L’ACADIEN II’s circumstances was not available to the JRCC contributed to the length of time which passed before resources were dispatched. It was understood by JRCC that L’ACADIEN II had requested an ice escort, a service for which she was a low priority within Coast Guard policies. This, and the fact that this was consistently seen as a case of a breakdown as opposed to a SAR situation – at least in the early stages of this scenario – contributed to the delay in assigning a Coast Guard vessel to the situation.

4.4 Assignment of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER

On the afternoon of Friday 28 March, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was alongside in Sydney, NS. Under the operational control of the Regional Operations Centre in Dartmouth, NS, the vessel was multi-tasked with SAR response as her primary role and Ice Operations as a key duty until a SAR situation emerged.

The Commanding Officer was aware of a potential security operation as a tentative tasking. The CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER had already been doing some ice work, having escorted of the Newfoundland ferry in previous days and having conducted some ice-clearing in Sydney Harbour. The security work for which she was potentially responsible was related to a prospective response to the seal protest.

CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER had been given responsibility for primary SAR coverage for SAR sector east¹². The personnel of the JRCC were becoming more aware of the condition of the sealers off Sydney Bight, noting both the number of damaged or ice-bound vessels and the worsening forecast. In judging the potential risks, and in discussion with the staff of the Regional Operations Centre, Dartmouth, SAR coverage, which always has priority, was highlighted over both security and ice taskings and CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was advised.

At 18:59, the JRCC tasked the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER with a specific non-distress SAR case and to provide assistance to a number of vessels beset by ice. The phone call from JRCC with the Officer of the Watch in CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER mentioned both the MADELINOT WAR LORD AND THE L’ACADIEN II. It mentioned that the latter had defective steering and may need a tow, or would need to have the crew removed¹³. Getting underway at 19:21, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER made best speed towards Cape North.

The initial plan formed for managing the spectrum of stricken vessels suggested that the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER would close the MADELINOT WAR LORD first, as she was reported as taking on water and seemed to be the immediate priority. As the factors on-scene became clear, this priority shifted. A radio conversation with MADELINOT WAR LORD confirmed that the ingress of water was stemmed by their pumps¹⁴, no emergency pump was required, but an escort to clear water would be required so as not to worsen their condition.

At approximately 20:10, the JRCC provided an update of the complex scenario being played out on the ice and clarified it further for the bridge of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER. The description of the circumstances at play detailed an individual vessel called L’ACADIEN II, some seven miles off a lee shore, and included a specific task to tow her clear of the ice and to the nearest port of repair. Soon after, the weather forecast denoting strong north-east winds overnight and a potential gale within 24 hours served to confirm the sequence for the night’s work.

At 21:30 JRCC placed L’ACADIEN II on their active SAR case file as a non-distress SAR case. The vessel was not in distress, but was known to be essentially immobile and would be subject to the whims of the worsening forecast if not provided assistance. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER would go directly to the L’ACADIEN II to take her in tow and increase her clearance off the coast before the winds strengthened. MADELINOT WAR LORD and a third vessel, each further off the coast but in need of assistance, would be approached each in turn and brought into escort. The group would be brought to open water with the eventual goal of taking L’ACADIEN II to Sydney, essentially the nearest port of refuge as described in Coast Guard policy, for repair.

4.5 Setting the Tow and Making for Sydney

Arriving on scene at night, the crew of the L’ACADIEN II spotted the lights of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER approaching from the southeast at approximately 22:30. On a working channel, the master of L’ACADIEN II was advised that CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER would approach, come close aboard to port and pass the tow. Working through 9/10ths ice, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER arrived at the stricken sealer, passed roughly 15 m off her port beam, taking way off with the bow of the L’ACADIEN II some 10 m perpendicular to the stern of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER. Under the supervision of the Chief Officer and the Bos’n, a heaving line was then tossed, reaching across on the first throw.

Figure 9: The foredeck of L’ACADIEN II

A messenger line followed and then towing gear¹⁵, consisting of a double bridle, attached by a shackle to a towing hawser made of 1.5 inch diameter (3.8 cm) double-braided synthetic nylon similar to Samson braid. The crew on the foredeck of the L’ACADIEN II, illustrated in Figure 9, passed each bridle through a foredeck fairlead then slipped each eye over its own bollard, or bitt, illustrated in Figure 10. The length of the towline was set at approximately 27 m. The assessed horizontal distance which resulted from the gear in use was in the range of 22-24 m, measured from the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER’s towing fairlead to the bow of the L’ACADIEN II¹⁶.

Figure 10: L’ACADIEN II’s starboard fairlead and bitt

With the gear in place, and still working in considerable ice, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER slowly came up in speed to put strain on the tow. The balance between the slow speed which was necessary given the risks associated with the disparate size of the vessels, and the need for headway to make progress through the ice, would be a delicate one. Working through ice and at a speed of about three knots, bare steerage way for a large vessel such as CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, strain was taken on the tow and L’ACADIEN II fell in astern. No evidence suggests that the steering of L’ACADIEN II was locked or lashed, but simply that the rudder was left amidships. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER set a course to make for the MADELINOT WAR LORD that was locked in the ice 2.2 nautical miles away. The intent of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was to head for clear water to the east before the impending weather change. Passing close to the MADELINOT WAR LORD to render escort and offering them an escape route, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER made a turn to the east to where open leads in the ice were known to exist. The MADELINOT WAR LORD quickly fell in aft, hugging the stern of L’ACADIEN II as close as possible, lest her way again be constrained by the ice floes. L’ACADIEN II had been advised that they would not be towed to home port, but rather to Sydney, the nearest port of refuge. MADELINOT WAR LORD, also damaged but manoeuvrable, indicated that she intended to make for home port independently once free of the ice.

On board the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, a towing watch made up of two seamen on two-hour shifts was set. Their task was to watch the tow for any problems and keep the bridge advised on a working channel. The challenge of the tow was noted and their instructions were to cut the tow without hesitation or further instruction if, in their judgement, this was the correct action to ensure the safety of the towed vessel. An axe was placed at the towing fairlead for just this purpose. The Commanding Officer himself remained on the bridge, retaining command of the ship as always but also in control of the evolution, directly supervising events and keeping control of the ship’s movements, including working the engine controls himself.

Progress through the ice was slow, with an average speed of some 2.6 knots, not much more than a brisk walking pace. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was clearing a channel through the ice, a sliver of clear water forming directly astern of the Coast Guard vessel. With zones of pack and rafted ice on either side, ice would close in at varying rates astern of the two small vessels, depending on the pressures of the ice floes around them at any given juncture. The Bos’n and Chief Officer shared concern for the challenge of the tow. The master of the MADELINOT WAR LORD, observing from close astern, also felt reservations¹⁷. It was understood that the tow was more challenging and entailed more risk than an open water towing operation.

L’ACADIEN II took to cutting a series of yaws or S-curves from side to side, sometimes bouncing off the ice edge formed by the icebreaker’s passage. Strain on the towline increased and eased without any distinct rhythm. Movement of the towed vessel was at times perceived to be particularly erratic by some of the observers¹⁸. The motion was occasionally causing the towing watch in CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER such concern that they almost cut the tow, axe in hand, but then they would see things stabilize and relent. After a period of time the tow seemed to settle in¹⁹, notwithstanding the occasional irregular movements of the fishing vessel.

The perception of the tow from inside the L’ACADIEN II was less alarming²⁰. The yaw was not perceived as being severe, only some 3-5 meters off the baseline astern and limited by the ice. The crew had become accustomed to the effects of the ice during the early stages of the tow and the periodic rubs and knocks were not seen as problematic. The towing hawser was sometimes varying in slack and strain, and the bridles were occasionally catching in the anchor which was in its stowed position at the bullnose. Having settled into an acceptable pattern on the tow, the master of the L’ACADIEN II went to bed²¹ below, leaving two crewmembers on watch in the wheelhouse in compliance with the request of the Commanding Officer of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER for someone to be on watch in the wheelhouse at all times. Of note, engine power, both ahead and astern, was used by the wheelhouse watch in L’ACADIEN II to ease strain on the hawser²² or to prevent closing the stern of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER too closely when a springing motion from the short tow caused the distance to close.

With CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER making way towards the east and seeking open water, the towing evolution continued without significant episode for nearly two and a half hours. At about 00:30, the oncoming seamen’s watch was awakened, arriving on deck for their turnover²³ at approximately 00:50. The state of the tow was discussed, as was the fact that the previous watch had nearly cut the towline. The position of the axe at the towing fairlead was confirmed, the radio was turned over and the watch assumed. The senior seaman chose to turn off the deck-head lighting with the aim of gaining a better level of night vision and perspective. The bridge was advised that the new watch was on deck.

4.6 The Capsize

A short period after the change of the towing watch, the small convoy of three vessels arrived at an open lead, a section of comparatively open water measurably different from that experienced during the previous 2½ hours of transit. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER no longer had to strain through pack ice²⁴. There was neither ice closing in astern of her nor a linear wall of broken ice constraining the L’ACADIEN II in the wake of the icebreaker. Maximum speed over the ground was achieved at this point, recorded as reaching 4.1 knots.

MADELINOT WAR LORD noted the L’ACADIEN II struck an ice cake the size of a small car at this juncture, rocked unstably for a moment and then fell back under tow with strain on the towline²⁵. Neither the stern watch in CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER nor the survivors of the L’ACADIEN II recall this particular ice-caused motion, at least as remarkably as those who observed it from astern.

CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER’s speed over the ground decreased, eventually to 2.8 knots (5.18 km/h) at the critical moment of the accident. At this juncture almost all witnesses noted an angular movement by L’ACADIEN II to port. The perception of the severity and duration of the movement varies with each witness, but a clear movement of L’ACADIEN II to a position approaching the port the quarter of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER is consistent in testimony²⁶. Whether caused by a collision with ice, an unprompted application of engine thrust or some unintended application of port helm, or a combination of these effects, is unclear. What is evident is that L’ACADIEN II at least momentarily gained momentum sufficient to put slack in the towing hawser and give one witnesses in CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER pause to consider if the towed vessel meant to overtake them²⁷.

Whatever the cause, L’ACADIEN II veered to port and took up a position off the stern of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, displaced some 3-5 meters off the icebreaker’s track. The bridge team had noted some occasional ice cakes off their track, but did not initially view them with concern as they appeared to be passing well clear of the hull. The after towing watch also noted some occasional ice but were focused on L’ACADIEN II’s movements and the oscillation of slack and strain on the towline. They suddenly, seconds before impact, realized the potential for the sealing vessel to strike a significant piece of ice, an ice cake that was some 10-15 meters across and sat with about 1 meter showing above the water.

In L’ACADIEN II, the surviving wheelhouse watch hand perceived himself to be on the port quarter of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER for some time²⁸, becoming aware of the ice which now bore down on them when it was about half-way down the side of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER. Unable to steer to starboard due to the steering casualty, feeling that steering to port would make things worse and that an astern movement might part the tow, they chose to put throttles to full ahead at the moment of impact in the hopes of smashing through the ice. They did not succeed and felt that L’ACADIEN II wedged herself against the ice,²⁹ became unstable as at least part of her keel sat against this comparatively solid mass, and was pulled by the strain on the towline onto her starboard side. As cargo shifted and with it the centre of gravity of the vessel, she was dragged laterally for some moments, soon taking on water through windows and the cabin door, and then almost immediately capsized, as her capacity to right herself disappeared³⁰.

On the bridge of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, the Commanding Officer was observing the L’ACADIEN II’s movements from the starboard aft bridge window³¹ and moved quickly to the port wing to observe the result of the sheer. Upon arriving on the port side seconds later, he immediately noticed that L’ACADIEN II had taken a larger sheer than normal and seemed to hold for some moments a position comparatively broad on the quarter, despite there being strain on the towing hawser as well as on the port leg of the bridle³². A sizable ice cake suddenly caught his eye and fell astern to strike the L’ACADIEN II. As this was happening, he ordered full astern on the engine throttles and ordered his towing sentries astern to cut the tow on VHF Channel 19, the internal working frequency.

On the afterdeck of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, the watch saw L’ACADIEN II strike and climb onto the ice, witnessed the initial lateral pull and saw strain coming on the tow-line. As in L’ACADIEN II, the initial concern was that the towline would part, not the possibility of capsize³³. A call to the bridge was made to inform them of the strain and to advise them to stop. As the call was being made, they witnessed L’ACADIEN II fall over onto her side. As this was happening, a seaman took the axe and cut the towline. He parted the tow line with one blow but it was too late to prevent the capsize of the vessel as the L’ACADIEN II had almost immediately rolled to starboard into clear water and capsized.

As the astern power of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER took hold, the ship lost way³⁴ and her stern began a swing to port. When the bridge crew shifted to the starboard wing to keep sight of the tow, they first realized that the vessel had capsized.

4.7 The Rescue Effort

The crew of the MADELINOT WAR LORD made frantic calls on VHF Channels 6 and 16 to advise of the turn of events with L’ACADIEN II. Witnessing the capsize from a position just metres away, the MADELINOT WAR LORD immediately approached the hull to search for the crew.

In CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, the bridge crew heard the radio calls advising them of what they had just witnessed. With only the Commanding Officer and the Watch Officer to manage the many aspects of the emergency, they chose not to immediately respond to the call and prioritized their actions. They focussed at this stage on a man overboard recovery operation and raised the general alarm, manoeuvring the ship and preparing to launch the Fast Rescue Craft (FRC). In turn, they advised Coast Guard Radio and JRCC of the accident. Assistance, particularly a dive capability³⁵, was requested.

MADELINOT WAR LORD caught sight of one survivor and immediately approached to effect recovery. With one survivor on board, a second crew member was sighted on the opposite side of the capsized hull, prone on the ice. MADELINOT WAR LORD again manoeuvred for recovery. The CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER’s FRC was ready for launch seven minutes after the internal alarm was sounded. It was launched and was underway some four minutes later. It was dispatched to assist in the rescue with the Chief Officer aboard to assess the situation. Ice conditions began to change, though whether wind, current or ice pressure was the cause is uncertain.

As CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER manoeuvred in an attempt to fend off the closing ice floe and keep open water around the scene, her three powerful fixed flood-lights astern³⁶ swung around leaving the accident scene unlit for some moments, until the search lights fitted on top of the wheelhouse came into play. An anxious search for more survivors was engaged in by both MADELINOT WAR LORD and the FRC as ice conditions worsened, constraining the movement of the smaller vessels. Sounds were heard coming from the hull and hope arose that this was the signal of survivors. With no other crew members visible, priority shifted to securing the hull in the hopes of preventing it from sinking and allowing access to any crew who might be trapped aboard. The FRC was brought back alongside to load securing strops for use with the foredeck buoy crane aboard the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER.

4.8 Securing L’ACADIEN II and Considering Cutting into the Hull

The FRC of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER made its way back to the overturned hull and joined the crew of the MADELINOT WAR LORD in rigging strops in the hopes of securing the hull and preventing her from sinking, possibly with trapped survivors on board. Meanwhile, with rafted ice again constraining movement, the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER made her way carefully³⁷ towards the accident site. Concerns regarding a collision with the L’ACADIEN II or the vessels tending her, injuring their crews, or of crushing an unseen survivor on the ice weighed heavily on the bridge team. The goal was to close as rapidly as safety allowed, stabilize the L’ACADIEN II and assess the options for searching for potential survivors. With the overturned condition of the hull and the salvage gear available, it was believed that the options were limited.

Figure 11: Portable gas saw from CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, with blade removed

Almost an hour after the accident, the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was alongside the pair of sealing vessels, securing the overturned hull of the L’ACADIEN II with the assistance of the MADELINOT WAR LORD, balancing the strain on strops placed fore and aft and in turn, taking up the load with her buoy crane. The weight of the vessel was greater than the working capacity of the crane and a minor list quickly developed.

Consideration was given to cutting a hole in the hull, but the risks were deemed too high that this could release the remaining air pocket out and cause the hull and missing crew to sink. When word was received of a delay in the arrival of the divers, it was decided that the limited time remaining for any of the missing to survive the conditions outweighed the potential risks. Working in the dark on the bobbing hull and using a 12” circular saw, a Coast Guard seaman worked to cut the hull at a spot below the engine compartment of the L’ACADIEN II, as advised by one of the survivors. The site of the cut was accurate, but the hull frames were numerous and deeper than the saw’s blade, making progress slow. One of the survivors from L’ACADIEN II was able to look into the space. An air pocket was present, but no crewmen of the L’ACADIEN II were found. Unable to make their way into the hull, a foam patch was set to help retain the air pocket and keep the hull afloat.

Figure 12: Securing L’ACADIEN II alongside CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER

4.9 The Dive Teams and Recovery of Casualties

Given the unsuccessful attempt to penetrate the hull, the rescuers were forced to wait for the arrival of the Search and Rescue technicians and their penetration dive capabilities. Attempts by JRCC and the Coast Guard Radio Station staff to locate civilian dive teams had failed to locate assets in Cape Breton with the skills or mobility to arrive on-scene³⁸. The focus for this capability was placed on the Department of National Defence and the Search And Rescue (SAR) Squadron at CFB GREENWOOD in Nova Scotia.

Unfortunately an equipment malfunction, related to a failure of vital communications equipment delayed their departure. Two teams of two divers were eventually dispatched and began arriving on scene, the first pair being hoisted down with their equipment from a CORMORANT helicopter to the flight deck of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER at approximately 06:00. Quickly assessing the scene and determining the possibility, though remote³⁹, of survivors in the hull, the second pair of divers circling overhead in a fixed-wing HERCULES aircraft were called in and arrived with their gear by parachute drop onto the ice and in the water.

With the assistance of the MADELINOT WAR LORD⁴⁰, dive gear and SAR Techs were recovered and united into a four-person dive team and a plan for the dive set in place. Diving in vinyl dry-suits with CABA breathing apparatus and equipped with an extensive tool-kit, including extra air cylinders, a sequence of four dives, each of 10-20 minutes duration, was set into motion.

The first diver recovered two bodies from the wheelhouse. The second diver secured gear in both the wheelhouse and the berthing compartment to minimize the possibility of entanglement and to assist in the search. The third diver discovered a third victim in the berthing compartment and effected the extraction. Both the exterior and interior of the vessel were scoured for potential survivors, as well as for the bodies.

On the fourth dive, while again investigating the internal spaces of L’ACADIEN II, it was apparent that even the slightest movement of the vessel was allowing equipment to shift within the inner spaces, increasing the potential for diver entrapment. This factor, along with the debilitating effects of hypothermia⁴¹ being felt by all four divers as a result of the extreme conditions of the dive operation, determined that they would not attempt to conduct a second round of dives as the risk had become too great and it was clear that they were no longer on a search for survivors⁴². The missing crewman had not been found within the hull and was not readily visible either in the rigging or under the ice. It was concluded that he had been lost at sea.

4.10 Repatriation of Survivors and Initiating Search Reduction

With search and recovery operations complete, focus turned to the transportation of the survivors and the bodies of the three victims. The two survivors had asked to meet the Commanding Officer and were brought to the bridge of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER to express the desire to be transported to the Magdalen Islands as soon as possible to be reunited with their families. Arrangements were made through the JRCC and the Coast Guard ROC and a Coast Guard helicopter was dispatched, arriving on board late in the morning of the 29th and flew the two survivors to the Islands.

Concurrent with this activity, JRCC and the SAR Commander in Halifax were faced with considerations of scaling down the search for the missing crewman. Much air activity had been conducted in the area as well as the search by the SAR Techs. All hope of locating the crewman alive had passed and the core role of the available SAR assets had to be respected by prioritizing their employment for search and recovery of the living⁴³. A determination was made to reduce the search effort and pass the file on to the RCMP as a missing person’s case, the normal process in such circumstances. The JRCC case officer undertook to advise the families of this decision and the operational imperatives at play. Unfortunately for the family of the missing man, an intermediary agent failed to relay the decision and the family only learned of the change through the news media.

4.11 Releasing the Hulk

Approaching mid-morning of 29 March, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER remained beside the overturned hull of L’ACADIEN II, strops attached, holding a 2-2½ degree list and maintaining a tenuous attachment to a weight well beyond the safe operating limit of the crane. When the SAR case was terminated as confirmed by the completion of the dives, a series of events occurred which lowered the case file in terms of priority as compared to other cases ongoing in the area. These included vessels taking on water. An air sector search⁴⁴ for the missing crewmember was conducted by a second CORMORANT helicopter from Gander, but the assignment of SAR units was reduced with time.

MADELINOT WAR LORD indicated a desire to make for home, as well as an expectation that CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER would provide her escort. The need to transport the remains of the three victims arose as the key factor in determining the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER’s next course of action. Acknowledging that CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was unable to either salvage or tow the overturned and now abandoned vessel, and cognizant of the other priorities at hand, consultations with the JRCC in Halifax, the ROC in Dartmouth, the Transportation Safety Board and Transport Canada allowed management to determine that the L’ACADIEN II should be set adrift with a transponder left at the location. It was deployed primarily to track the drift of the hull in the hopes of assisting in the recovery of the missing crewmember and would also provide information to authorities ashore about what had now become a potential danger to navigation. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER let loose the strops at 08:48, withdrew from her position alongside L’ACADIEN II and stood off observing the stern section of L’ACADIEN II and looking for the missing person for the remainder of the day while awaiting instructions.

Figure 13: View of L’ACADIEN II from CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER on 29 March 2008

With slightly improving ice conditions, MADELINOT WAR LORD began her transit to home port independently at about 09:30, eventually joining company with another sealing vessel. Later that day, at approximately 17:02, after being released from the L’ACADIEN II case by JRCC, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER contacted MADELINOT WAR LORD to ascertain if further assistance was required. The offer was declined. Advising JRCC of the circumstances on scene, CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was released from the MADELINOT WAR LORD case at 17:12. CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER then made her way to Sydney Harbour to deliver the remains of the victims. A transponder buoy was placed on the ice before departing as instructed by the JRCC, but the signal did not activate. As the signal is only received at specialized antenna locations ashore, the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER was only made aware of the malfunction some time later when alongside in Sydney.

4.12 Repatriation of the Deceased

It was initially felt that the remains of the three victims, which had been gathered on board the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, would also be transported directly to the Magdalen Islands. Subsequently, it was realized that the location of the accident off the coast of Cape Breton gave jurisdiction of the required medical examination to Nova Scotia. The bodies were transferred to the Medical Examiner of Nova Scotia with the ship’s return to Sydney Harbour, via the RCMP who serve as the Medical Examiner’s agents in such circumstances. Several days later, with the medical examination completed, arrangements were made to repatriate the remains to Cap Aux Meules for commemorative services and burial.

4.13 Issues in the Aftermath

With the malfunction of the tracking buoy and consideration of the potential value of recovering the hull to assist in the investigation, a number of Government air assets and Coast Guard vessels were assigned to search for the remains of the missing seaman and the vessel. The option to salvage remained a possibility. The hull was located on at least two occasions within significant surface ice and with only the after end remaining visible above the ice. Before salvage assets could be set into motion the air pockets presumably diminished and the vessel sank. It is possible that the L’ACADIEN II sat semi-buoyant in the water column⁴⁵ and traveled on the currents for some time afterwards. On 17 July, debris from the L’ACADIEN II was found in St-Esprit area, couth west of Fourchu, Cape Breton. Including the fibreglass 4-person life pod, immersion suits and a life ring, the discovery was unquestionably of material from the sealing vessel, though the hull itself has not been located.

11 One survivor recalls the slow pace through the ice but that the mood was positive and that there was optimism for the remainder of the hunt, once the core of the seal herd was located.
12 As a primary SAR asset, it should be noted that alcohol is not available to the ship’s company as dictated in Coast Guard Policies and Orders.
13 This conversation, held between the JRCC Watch Officer and the Officer of the Watch in the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, represents the single reference found in the transcripts to the possibility of removing the crew. Subsequent discussion focused on the task of towing the damaged vessel.
14 The MADELINOT WAR LORD had initially reported that she was taking on water through the stern tube, a term describing where the engine shaft-line pierces the hull to reach the screw or propeller. A vulnerable spot which is susceptible to leaking, some damage had been caused while manoeuvring in the ice. The ingress of water was measurable but not sufficient to be described as ‘flooding’. Pumps on board were stemming the flow and stabilizing the situation. Concern did exist for potential further damage while manoeuvring in the ice and the possibility of further, stronger water ingress. This situation resulted in the request by the master of the MADELINOT WAR LORD to Sydney Coast Guard Radio for assistance in the form of escort to clear water.
15 This process was typical of passing equipment at sea, where a succession of larger, and stronger lines are passed, each one lashed or tied to the other, until the heavier equipment is in place.
16 This calculation takes into account the height differential between the foredeck of the L’ACADIEN II and the towing fairlead, as well as the catenary of the towline, the loop which is formed as the weight of the towline.
17 During an interview, the Master of the MADELINOT WAR LORD commented on his sense that the tow was risky and that he felt it verged on the edge of disaster on several occasions.
18 The towing watch on the afterdeck of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER and observers in the MADELINOT WAR LORD offered a variety of descriptions of the progress of the tow. Essentially all spoke about occasions where L’ACADIEN II contacted the ice edge, meandered in the wake at least to some degree, and never fell into a movement that could be described as predictable.
19 Described by one witness as unpredictable but no longer alarming.
20 Both survivors described their significant observations of the towing evolution as witnessed from the wheelhouse of the L’ACADIEN II. Both spoke about unpredictable yawing motions and contact with the ice edge astern of the icebreaker. Apart from the specific ice cake that caused the capsize, neither felt a sense of alarm with the contact with ice or with the jostling that would result. They said that the previous week of working through the ice had left them accustomed to the rubs, movements and sounds of striking ice.
21 It was observed by one survivor that the master felt comfortable with the Coast Guard’s presence and the initial stages of the tow. In commenting on the speed of the advance and the condition of the tow, he is quoted as saying “we won’t break any eggs here”.
22 Comments from the survivors of L’ACADIEN II suggest that the strain on the towline and the potential for it breaking, served as their main issue of concern, more than yawing or contact with ice, as the evolution continued.
23 Proper procedure requires the off-going watch to brief the oncoming watch on equipment, responsibilities, orders and observations. Only when this is completed can the watch be relieved.
24 Concentrations of ice through most of the towing evolution were reported at 8-9/10ths of pack ice. The open lead was of sufficient scope to change at least some of the conditions affecting the tow.
25 Only the master of the MADELINOT WAR LORD made a comment on this particular collision with ice, describing it precisely as ``the size of a small car``. Neither survivor remembers seeing nor contacting such an ice cake in the minutes prior to striking the ice which caused the capsize. In CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, neither bridge personnel, two of whom were likely positioned on the starboard side at this juncture, nor the two lookouts of the towing watch noticed this ice collision.
26 Only one observer did not perceive a movement of the L’ACADIEN II at least to some degree to port. Amongst the other observers, including the survivor positioned in the wheelhouse of L’ACADIEN II, there is variance in their descriptions of speed of movement, strain on the towline, and distance off the baseline position directly astern of the icebreaker.
27 The perspectives of each witness varied, often affected by their placement and point of view. One observer, a member of the lookout watch on the afterdeck of the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER, distinctly noted slack in the towing hawser, movement to the port quarter and a reduction of the distance between the two vessels.
28 The wheelhouse survivor from L’ACADIEN II described a much less sudden movement to port than observed by the Coast Guard witnesses, though he perceived remaining on the port quarter for some time, noting that from their position aft he could see almost the whole of the port side of the icebreaker.
29 External observers almost unanimously perceived that the L’ACADIEN II mounted the ice cake to some degree. Internally, the wheelhouse survivor is insistent that they did not ride up on the ice but, rather, they planted the bow with the stern rising up before rolling over. This latter image is akin to a slow-moving bicycle hitting the sidewalk, the back wheel lifting before falling over.
30 A vessel is designed to survive the motion of the sea and to return to the upright position by default. The stability curves for L’ACADIEN II corroborate the fact that her design was inherently stable, though as in all vessels there was a natural ‘point-of-no-return’ in her design curves. Having gone beyond this point, due to the leverage of the ice and the pull of the towline, L’ACADIEN II was unable to return to the upright position and capsized. This is more fully covered in the analysis.
31 High in the ship and surrounded by windows, the bridge gives a good vantage point for its occupants to observe events around them. One exception is the area directly astern of the vessel which is obscured by the ship’s superstructure. The port and starboard after windows, and the external bridge wings, or walkways, give the best, if compromised, visibility when looking aft. Often, only the stabilizers and masthead would be visible from the bridge.
32 The perception from the port bridge wing was that L’ACADIEN II sat momentarily on the port quarter, perhaps 45 or as much as 60 degrees off a baseline directly astern. With strain on the port leg of the towing bridle, L’ACADIEN II should have immediately started moving back to the centreline, a position more directly astern of the icebreaker.
33 Interviews with both towing watches confirm that the parting of the towline was the biggest concern. At the time of the accident, the seaman charged with cutting the towline perceived the issue of strain on the line and the potential parting of the tow as his first concern.
34The momentum of the icebreaker continued to drive her forward even with astern power engaged, likely allowing the vessel to move some 60 to 100 meters from where astern power was initially applied. At a certain point, located on the starboard bridge wing, with headway gone and a swing of the ship’s head to starboard initiated, the Commanding Officer stopped engines and assessed his next actions.
35 Coast Guard ships do not have SCUBA diver capability. Only the navy retains such skills at sea and only in their larger vessels. With a capsized vessel, the Commanding Officer of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER saw the importance of diving capability in aiding the rescue effort. Of note, however, is the fact that this effort would require the skills of ‘penetration diving’, the specialized and rare capability to enter a submerged hull. Only the divers of the military’s SAR Squadrons have this skill within government assets.
36 See Figure 16.
37 This phase of the rescue was described in some detail by the Commanding Officer and the First Officer who described the challenge of balancing the desire to immediately return to the scene of the accident with ensuring the safety of the rescue workers and the potential survivors. With the return of the ice and the imprecise movements of a vessel as large as the icebreaker, a real risk of collision in close quarters existed as well as the possibility of overrunning a survivor on the ice.
38 The winter season is the off-season for most commercial dive companies as well as the majority of civilian dive clubs. Although some fire departments have dive capability this is mostly used for evidence recovy, not wreck penetration. The unique nature of the dive skill required and the urgency of bringing people together meant that only the SAR Technicians had the skills and mobility to respond.
39 The SAR community uses tables which describe the likely survival times for mariners immersed in water. The tables take into account a range of factors including individual fitness, age weight, clothing, use of a flotation device, the water temperature and whether the individual is fully or partially immersed. The conditions at hand did not offer an optimistic scenario because so much time had passed. Because the rescuers reported hearing knocking coming from the hull, the divers concluded that this faint hope required that they attempt a penetration of the capsized vessel.
40 Assigned to assist in gathering the diving equipment dropped by parachute from the SAR HERCULES aircraft, the master and crew of the MADELINOT WAR LORD responded with skill and energy, ensuring that they arrived immediately at every drop site and avoided any loss of equipment on the ice or in the water. Similarly, they quickly recovered the two divers after their parachute drop, in one case removing a diver from an ice cake and, in another, precluding a diver from having to remain too long immersed in water after landing in an open lead. It should be noted that, in Canada at least, this is the first recorded SAR parachute-drop onto winter sea ice.
41 These were extreme conditions for a diving rescue. Both the environmental conditions and the technical aspects of the work were on the edge of the safety envelope. The dive suits and thin thermal underwear employed that day offered only limited thermal protection from the frigid water. All four divers showed symptoms of hyperthermia, including violent shivers, muscle pain, cramps and loss of muscle control. Numbness to the hands, and indeed loss of hand control and movement, represented a significant potential danger in the cramped quarters of a penetration dive.
42 SAR policy states that SAR Techs will only risk their lives for the living, or for the injured still thought to be alive. Once the first round of dives was completed, the situation and the risk to the divers had to be considered, resulting in a decision to cease diving operations.
43 The SAR Commander, the navy Rear Admiral based in Halifax, is required to manage his available assets carefully given the size of his area of responsibility, ranging from the Arctic to Nova Scotia and out to the central Atlantic. Using SAR policy as a guide, and with the advice of his SAR specialists, he determines when a search effort is reduced and ceased.
44 Sector searches are areas searched by aircraft or ships, whether with radar or other electronic sensors or with a visual lookout. Conditions of wind and sea will determine the type of search pattern, as will the mobility of the person or item being sought. In the case of the missing crewman from L’ACADEIN II, the search pattern was localized to take account of wind and current.
45 It is possible that the hull of the L’ACADIEN II slowly released the air pockets trapped in the hull, meaning it did not sink to the ocean floor immediately after slipping beneath the surface ice cover. Semi-buoyant and semi-submerged, the vessel could have been carried on the currents for some time, likely moving in a south or southeasterly direction, a theory borne out by the recovery of some of its wreckage along the east coast of Nova Scotia.

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