Having set the scene in general, it is important to describe key concepts which served as the filters for viewing the sequence of events and the subsequent analysis of the L’ACADIEN II incident. These lenses are required to a degree because of the unique nature of an accident as an event. They are particularly applicable as a result of the maritime environment in which events took place.
In setting out to collect the story of the L’ACADIEN II as fully and accurately as possible, the investigation team was cognizant of the human and behavioural factors that may have been at play during and after the accident. No video rendition of the event was available. The story could only be arrived at through the eyes and the memories of those who were there. The pace of events, night-time conditions, the glare of the lights, fatigue and shock, all potentially served to impact awareness and skew priorities of action during the incident as well as influence the capacity for recollection afterwards, whether immediately or over the course of time.
The physical and emotional factors of fear and adrenaline, vantage point and proximity, touched each participant differently. These factors affected point of view, peripheral vision and each individual’s cone of awareness9 and each participant’s capacity to record and recollect10. Some remembered perfectly the images and choices they faced. Others remember more blur than detail. The imperative of dealing with a string of individual emergency situations caused some to focus and forget, as they moved from one event shock to another. Survival instinct and reflex responses all played a part in the conduct of the event.
In situations where disagreement was not easily resolved or where data or testimony was insufficient, reconstruction, trials and demonstrations were utilized to help fill the gaps.
It is important to fully appreciate the concept allied to what is described as the standard of conduct related to the safe practice of seamen. The concept is not defined by a line, where one side is right and the other is wrong. It is a zone, fairly broad in scope, shaped by tradition, practice, experience, culture, environment and local conditions. While excellent manuals abound, none can address every circumstance for every scenario. Individual ships and individual teams are often wont to develop local practice which, though based on sound written doctrine, is just as likely to be evolved and passed along through word of mouth. While operating at sea, it is rare to find a single answer or solution to a generic problem, challenge or evolution. When asking a sea-going officer, an experienced seaman, an experienced fisherman or sealer for an opinion related to conduct at sea, the response will begin with ‘well, it depends’ as often, if not more, than ‘there’s only one way.’
This is not to suggest for an instant that an ad hoc approach is an acceptable basis for the conduct of operations and evolutions at sea, as nothing could be further from the truth. Ad hoc effort does not survive long at sea. It does speak to the fact that rote adherence and one-size-fits-all approaches are equally worthy of rejection, since life at sea rarely serves up risk-laden scenarios in a predictable fashion. The professional and prudent mariner will base his or her decisions on book knowledge, theory, experiential learning and a keen observation of the issues and conditions at hand. The key factor in both effectiveness and survival is often experience, commonly described as a seaman’s eye. This describes not only the enhanced powers of observation that comes from years at sea, the seeing and doing that comes with them, but the sixth sense, the feeling in the water, that comes from having taken risks and sometimes living close to the edge. It delivers the sense of confidence required to assume risk comfortably as well as the inner sense that it may be time to just back away. What it never offers is the easy answer when conditions demand action that may well be beyond an individual’s, or a crew’s, scope of experience. This is a particular reality of life at sea where the environment, the sea itself, is almost invariably the most dynamic source of danger, often with no options to decline the risks that danger represents.
A walk along the edge of a pier or jetty at a busy port will entail risk; even for those too naive to understand the position they are in. Life at sea not only demands understanding but insists in fact that one take satisfaction in, or at least become accustomed to and comfortable with, real risk to life and limb almost every moment of every day at sea. For the land-lubber, this is an odd concept often too difficult to fathom. The risk-acceptance point of view runs counter to current trends and societal norms founded in preventative theory and risk-avoidance. This is what makes life at sea special and those who willingly set out to face these risks, whether for profession, profit or leisure, comparatively unique.
Risk is often undertaken knowingly, even willingly, but should never be assumed glibly. A clear understanding of why risk is necessary, the depth of talent and experience at hand to deal with and mitigate the risk situation, as well as a mental if not written formulaic balance of potential outcomes and benefits should be a part of any professional risk analysis. A sage mariner’s invocation regarding risk asks; if you never take a risk when you have the option, how will you ever know you can face risk when there is no choice? Whatever the guiding calculations regarding risk, the difference between professionalism and recklessness can be a fuzzy line, most especially to those least accustomed to the practice.
9 It is recognized that urgent life-and-death events often cause a certain ‘tunnel-vision’ in those involved. This is a normal physiological effect when undergoing abnormal events.
10 A key element of each witness interview was the establishment of the level of fidelity the witness had in his own recollections. These, naturally, varied widely. Witnesses were sincere in their responses, striving to provide detail to the overall understanding of events while being clear as to what was memory and what was ‘impression’.