Chapter 2 — Context for the Incident

The Gulf of St. Lawrence is a well-utilized ocean seaway bordered by five provinces, utilized by a range of resource-exploitation industries and plied by significant international shipping. The presence of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, sovereign French soil, signifies that this is not an exclusively Canadian domain. It makes up a commercial complex of significant proportions, represented by a range of fisheries, oil and gas exploration and recovery, tourism and transportation. It represents a complex mix of internal waterways, coastal waters and international waters within the Canadian exclusive economic zone².

Numerous legal and regulatory jurisdictions come into play in the region. Within the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans alone, numerous rule-sets, policies, laws and organizational silos have interests, application or mandates in the region, not all coherently inter-related or aligned.

Departmentally, areas of responsibility and ownership are described by a layered set of boundaries for Search And Rescue (SAR) zones, Conservation & Protection regions, Fisheries areas and Coast Guard regions. Silos exist which are sometimes geographic, sometimes activity-based. The Coast Guard itself is a Special Operating Agency³.

Where fifteen years ago the range of the Federal fleet within the current organizational realm of Fisheries and Oceans was seen as distinct and specialized by activity, reorganization and amalgamation have brought a sea change in the appearance of multi-tasking. The down-size of Government in the deficit-fighting years of the ‘90s had impact on resource management and the search for efficiencies has clearly been a consistent Federal theme. A consequence worth noting is that from seaward, in the eyes of the seagoing community and in particular the fishery, the red-hulled Coast Guard vessel is now, as often as not, an enforcer as opposed to a rescuer⁴. This speaks particularly to the realities of resource management for the Federal fleet and the aspect of multi-tasking. Vessels are assigned one role and then another, with regularity and sometimes with rapidity. It is not uncommon for a vessel tasked to 30-minute SAR response to in fact be conducting ice clearing or some other activity while awaiting a potential call. This is generally manageable for the crews involved. This is also efficient and cost effective for resource managers concerned with overall sea-day availability and the cost of running the fleet, but it does have potential consequences in terms of vessel placement and prospective response times. The key to success in managing the challenges of fleet assets and taskings is effective and ongoing internal liaison so as to manage expectations amongst stakeholders, including the customer, that being the maritime community at large.

Figure 1: Distribution of Canadian Coast Guard and other Federal vessels on 28 March 2008

The coastal communities of the region, in whatever the Province, are largely rural and view their livelihood on the sea as both traditional and a right. Family roots and customary livelihood often go back generations. From years gone by, there remains in the coastal ports and villages of the Region an expectation of support from Government. Less related to entitlement than a simple desire for assistance to get to sea to ply their trade; the sea is a highway and they expect it to be cleared so they can get to work. In the post-reorganization here and now, there remain some misunderstandings in these communities as to the multi-layered mandate, roles and tasks of what is often perceived to be a singular Federal fleet. At the time of the incident, twenty-eight Coast Guard vessels were at sea or available in the waters of Quebec, the Maritimes and Newfoundland and Labrador, known as the Atlantic Zone. There were ten in the waters adjacent to the Gulf. This represents a significant resource investment by any measure, and is remarkable for the rate of traffic normally at hand during this time of year, but one still challenged by scale of geography and pace of activity.

Figure 2: Ice Conditions on 28 March 2008

It should be noted that traversing and working in coastal ice zones is fairly common for the communities of the region and for the east coast’s Coast Guard, though rare for the average sea-going crew around the world. Any ice, whether iceberg, growler, floe or cake is potentially dangerous and is to be approached with caution and respect. Movement, due to sea or swell, thickness and stability, each demand an awareness and nimbleness unnecessary in the shore environment, whether on board or for those who venture out on the ice. Night-time conditions and fog make navigation challenging and sometimes dangerous. Because of the physical attributes of ice and radio waves and the effects of environmental conditions on radar signals, vessel radar is measurably compromised and often inadequate in displaying ice to the mariner⁵. Selection of a course in ice during reduced visibility is often more guess than decision.

As noted in Figure 2 above, the ice chart for 28 March, the winter of 2007/08 delivered a comparatively significant ice mass in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and approaches. Though certainly not unprecedented, ice conditions off the Magdalen Islands and Cape Breton in March were not the norm which the seagoing community had experienced over the ten previous seasons. Extensive ice had been recorded in March of 2003 and to a lesser extent in 2004 and 2005. This year’s ice was challenging in that the shelf of first year ice completely enveloped the Magdalen Islands, a condition not seen in the ten previous seasons. Ice conditions in turn had consequences for both the start of the seal breeding season and the ability of sea-going commerce, including the sealing fleet, to make for sea.

2.1 Factors at Play on 28 March

Two dynamics influenced the movements of the L’ACADIEN II and a measurable portion of the remainder of the sealing fleet towards the waters off northeast Cape Breton: the condition of the ice and the distribution of developing and sometimes detailed information regarding the seal herd. CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS was specifically assigned to observe the hunt and assist where required. The main concentration of seals was known to be off Cheticamp, along the west coast of Cape Breton, but the ice conditions precluded the sealers reaching this area.

Figure 3: Satellite imagery of the ice pack on 29 March 2008

CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS assisted in breaking out a group of sealers trapped in the ice and escorted them to an area of less pressure where more open water leads might be found, in the hopes they would find an alternate concentration of seals that would allow them to resume the hunt. The crew of the L’ACADIEN II followed the perceived path of least resistance as provided by CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS towards their best guess in seeking a concentration in the herd so as to achieve their quota in the hunt, making for St. Paul Island and then down into Sydney Bight⁶. This area is viewed with some caution, particularly by mariners in the fishing community, and for some is viewed with a sense of foreboding given the number of vessels lost in this quarter⁷. The Coastal Pilot, the Canadian Hydrographic publication which describes Canadian waters for mariners in some detail, describes the approaches to Sydney as being subject to major ice conditions and to measurable ocean and tidal currents⁸, factors not uncommon for the region as a whole. It does specifically caveat the dangers of a northeast gale, noting that being trapped in rafted ice or run onto a lee shore and aground can result if caution is not taken to ensure sufficient sea-room.

Figure 4: Ice Conditions on 29 March 2008

At the time of the incident, the pack ice off the Cape Breton shore was largely reported as 8-9/10th with varying thickness, but mostly greater than 15 cm. Some clear leads were reported, and indeed these are visible in the satellite imagery of the day. On the afternoon of 28 March the weather sensors at St. Paul Island, to the northeast of Cape Breton, reported winds from northwest to northerly at 5 to 10 knots, with a forecast of winds shifting to north-northeast that evening. No swell was evident on the ice. A set, the combined effects of wind drift and current, was observed to the southwest in the afternoon of 28 March, while the set had shifted at the time of the accident to running in a south-easterly direction at the position of the L’ACADIEN II at about 1 knot. The meteorological forecast issued at approximately 20:00 warned of onshore winds of up to 20 knots, with freezing spray conditions and occasional snow. The ice chart at Figure 4 shows the effect of the onshore winds on the ice, as compared to the ice profile at Figure 2. As well, the Sunday outlook was for strong to gale force northwesterlies.

Figure 5: L’ACADIEN II on the afternoon of 28 March 2008

In discussing the context of the event, it is pertinent to consider the particulars of the two key vessels involved. The L’ACADIEN II was a 12.56 m long multi-purpose fishing vessel, configured for sealing at the time of her capsize. With a beam of 4.88 m and a draft of some 1.6 m laden, she had the typical boxy configuration of vessels of her type, built for sea-going robustness and capacity, not for speed. Her hull, made of aluminium and reinforced for ice, was stubby, broad and flat-bottomed. At approximately 35 gross tons, powered by a 300 horsepower diesel engine driving a single right-hand-turning shaft, the vessel was capable of up to 10 knots. The stability curves show that she had a design that was stable, though she had undergone some modifications from her original build related to ice strengthening. Essentially, this would have put weight low in the vessel, notionally an enhancement to stability. It should be stated that an engineering review of the stability curves for L’ACADIEN II revealed no concerns.

Figure 6: CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER

The CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER is a high-endurance multi-purpose vessel and is considered a light icebreaker. At 78.39 m in length, 16.2 m in breadth, drawing 5.75 m and at 3727 gross tons, this is a powerful ocean-going vessel. With diesel-electric propulsion delivering roughly 7000 horsepower or 5250 kilowatts to a twin screw configuration, a normal cruising speed of 13.7 knots (25.37 km/h) could be pushed to a maximum speed of 16 knots (29.63 km/h). The vessel is designed to utilize the significant power available to move effectively through winter ice, not race. With nearly a full load of fuel, once underway she would build some considerable momentum, meaning the ship would not stop quickly.

For those uninitiated to ships and the sea, it is worth considering these vessels in a more familiar comparative context. A modern ocean-going container ship is the sea-going equivalent of a highway tractor-trailer with dual rig, fast but not very nimble. A naval destroyer is akin to a Formula 1 racer in terms of speed, power and nimbleness. A fishing vessel such as L’ACADIEN II is very much like a farm tractor and the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER is a combination of snow-plough, tow-truck and road grader, a powerful, flexible, multi-use platform. As pertains to the tow, the CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER represented a vessel over six times as long, 100 times the tonnage and some 17 times the horsepower of the L’ACADIEN II. It represented the equivalent of a Mack truck towing a golf cart.

Figure 7: Schematic side view of CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER and L’ACADIEN II, delivered to scale

F/V L’ACADIEN II

Built in 1988
Dimension: 13.7 m X 4.88 m X 2.15 m
Net Tonnage: 17.73 TONS
Official Number: 811285

CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER

Built in 1987
Dimension: 83 m X 16.2 m X 5.75 m
Net Tonnage: 1534.61 TONS
Official Number: 607685

2 The ocean approaches to Canada represent some of the most complex jurisdictional domains within Canada’s sovereign territory. From the port to the limit of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, municipal, provincial, federal and international regulations come into play.
3 See http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Canadian Coast Guard websites.
4 A number of sealers interviewed spoke to this issue, lamenting the reductions in a variety of Federal resources supporting the fishery, from radio stations to vessels at sea. Some commented that where once the red hulls were there to save them, they now often seem more intent on policing them.
5 Ice is a poor reflector and has the capacity to actually absorb radar energy. Even icebergs are notorious for poorly displaying on radar displays. The face of a wave is more reflective than an ice chunk at sea. Night lighting and an efficient lookout are absolute requirements when transiting in the proximity of ice.
6 One survivor described the challenges of the ice and the periodic efforts of the CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS to assist the sealers. This included some escort work as well as occasionally breaking out vessels which had become icebound.
7 One sealer described the advice he had received from an ocean-going mariner to never enter this area. Several mentioned that they had concerns as they approached Sydney Bight and couldn’t understand why CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS was leading them there.
8 Currents can be wind generated, tidal based on the cycles of the moon, or induced rivers flows as is the case in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

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