At the outset of this report, the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of numerous contributors to this complex investigation. Numerous Coast Guard personnel provided testimony and support to this effort. Other federal agencies including the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Department of National Defence, the Transportation Safety Board and Transport Canada added their efforts.
In particular, the survivors, the families of the victims and certain members of the sealing community all gave profoundly of themselves to enable this effort. Throughout the process, the desire to uncover all the facts possible in an effort to accurately describe what happened and to learn from the incident was evident in every exchange.
On 28 March 2008, the 12.5 m (41 foot) sealing vessel L’ACADIEN II found itself damaged in what were exceptional ice conditions along the northeast coast of Cape Breton. The master contacted the Canadian Coast Guard for assistance. Both CCGS DES GROSEILLIERS and CCGS SIR WILLIAM ALEXANDER spent time on scene, with the latter vessel taking the L’ACADIEN II, which had damages its steering gear, under tow in the late hours of 28 March. At approximately 01:00 (local Atlantic time will be used throughout unless otherwise noted) on the morning of 29 March, the L’ACADIEN II was under tow and another sealer, the MADELINOT WAR LORD, was under escort close astern1.
A change in the ice conditions which had been experienced for the previous two hours occurred as the group entered a clear lead and comparatively open water. The L’ACADIEN II took a measurable sheer to port, struck a solid and sizable floe of rafted ice, and was forced onto her starboard side by the diagonal pull of the towing hawser. Before the towing hawser could be cut, allowing the vessel to right herself, the imparted 90+/- degree roll allowed liquid cargo and equipment to shift and flooding through window seams and the main cabin door. This, along with the continued strain on the hawser, precluded any righting moment. L’ACADIEN II quickly filled with water and capsized, with strain still on the towing hawser. Of the six aboard, two crewmembers narrowly escaped; three were caught in the vessel, their bodies recovered by divers; one crewmember was not found after the incident. As of this writing, he remains lost at sea.
The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for this independent internal investigation were conveyed on April 4, 2008, with a subsequent clarification delivered on April 14. The ToRs required an independent and unbiased assessment and review of the circumstances leading to and following the capsizing of L’ACADIEN II. The key areas for determination and assessment in the ToRs were:
In addition to ascertaining the course of the events surrounding the incident, the goals of the investigation were related to making preventative safety-oriented recommendations so as to preclude, to the degree possible, such a tragedy from occurring again. Neither direct blame nor implicit responsibilities were sought by the process. Further commentary on the TORs, the investigation team and the conduct of the investigation is included in Annex A.
1 The MADELINOT WAR LORD was stationed just meters astern or behind the L’ACADIEN II, described as “within a stone’s throw” by the master of the vessel.